INTRODUCTION B
USINESS FOR RNA INTERFERENCE (RNAi) therapeutics has never been better. The confluence of the genome revolution, a pharmaceutical industry greatly challenged by generic competition and starved for innovation, and preexisting nucleic acid drug development know-how that can now be directly applied to RNAi therapeutics means that RNAi, less than 10 years after its discovery in worms, has every chance of becoming the next major drug development platform for improving healthcare and generating profits at multiple levels. From the perspective of a molecular biologist interested in both basic and applied aspects of RNAi and related investments, I would like first to put RNAi into the context of the drug development enterprise and then discuss various strategies for translating the science of RNAi into commercially viable drugs as well as some of the risks the industry faces. Although the discussion will focus on RNAi therapeutics and the major U.S. and European markets, it should be kept in mind that RNAi is a global effort and holds further commercial promise in agriculture, the research reagent and services markets, and the related area of microRNA-based therapeutics and diagnostics.
GOOD TIMES FOR RNAi THERAPEUTICS
Timing has a lot to do with the financial potential of RNAi. In the same year that the sequence of the worm genome was published, 1998, Fire, Mello, and coworkers made the seminal discovery that double-stranded RNAs (dsRNAs) trigger RNAi gene knockdown in worms (Fire et al., 1998) , and just 1 year after the first draft of the human genome sequence was published in 2000, Tuschl and colleagues found that structurally defined small interfering RNAs (siRNAs) would do the same trick in human cells (Elbashir et al., 2001 ). Not only was it then immediately realized that the potent and highly selective RNAi pathway could be harnessed for studying the complexity of our genome, it also started to be adopted for drug target discovery and validation purposes (e.g., Hemmings-Mieszczak et al., 2003; Berns et al., 2004) . Using RNAi as a therapeutic modality itself seemed the logical next step, particularly because many of the potential drug targets that were emerging from the genome studies cannot be readily targeted by traditional means such as small molecules. One example is the protease PCSK9, which has attracted considerable interest as a very effective and probably safe target for the treatment of hypercholesterolemia . By addressing such otherwise undruggable, yet highly validated targets, RNAi therapeutics reduce target risk as well as financially benefit from developing medicines with new mechanisms of actions. Combined with potential development efficiencies that a platform technology such as RNAi offers, particularly by shortening the preclinical development stage, this should lead to more high-margin, innovative medicines with long and profitable product life cycles. This is compounded by the (from a business point of view) fortunate circumstance that RNAi remained hidden for so long, for had it been discovered twenty years ago, the typical life span of a U.S. patent, there would have been far fewer targets to choose from and enabling technologies.
The transition of RNAi into the clinic is further aided by the tremendous interest in RNA research in general. Partly because of the popularity of RNAi as a tool in the laboratory and the importance of the related microRNA pathway in human gene regulation, this resurgence owes its existence to the generally diverse roles played by RNAs in various aspects of biology including splicing, ribozyme regulation, and noncoding transcripts. Importantly, lessons drawn from such research, such as on the fundamental mechanism of RNAi or the immunostimulatory properties of nucleic acids, are very relevant to the RNAi drug development process. Because much of this is taking place in academia, this allows RNAi therapeutics companies to stay product-oriented while limiting their exposure to costly and time-consuming basic research to collaborations with academia. Because the technical entry barrier for translational RNAi research is relatively low, much of the drug discovery phase may be similarly sourced out to the academic community as leading research groups are exploring RNAi-based therapies for viral infections, metabolic disease, cancer, and beyond. Similarly, this allows diverse and innovative approaches to be tested, most of which will normally fail and therefore would be financially Department of Pediatrics, Stanford School of Medicine, Stanford, CA 94305. prohibitive for any single company to undertake. Such academic research, however, has already yielded a number of promising technologies, such as for RNAi delivery, and often from unexpected sources (Song et al., 2005; McNamara et al., 2006; Kumar et al., 2007) . Companies, in turn, are vying to evaluate and obtain rights to these solutions and may further facilitate this process by providing general RNAi support such as by supplying reagents. These efforts would not be possible without the broad financial support RNAi has enjoyed, due not only to recognition within the scientific community but also to increased awareness among the wider public (aided by events such as the winning of the 2006 Nobel Prize for Physiology and Medicine by A.Z. Fire and C.C. Mello) of the potential for RNAi therapeutics in medicine, the economy, and biosecurity. The considerable investment is illustrated by a PubMed search on the term [(siRNA) or (RNAi) or (RNA interference)], which yielded more than 22,000 entries on December 22, 2007. Grant support also extends to the commercial sector and includes funding through the National Institutes of Health (NIH)-funded Small Business Innovation Research mechanism and the proposed $1 billion dollar Massachusetts biotech initiative. The latter is quite notable not only because of its size, but also because it specifically aims to support both translational research and the biotech industry in key strategic areas such as RNAi.
RNAi AS AN RNA THERAPEUTIC PLATFORM TECHNOLOGY
RNAi is special not only in that it may address otherwise undruggable targets, but also because it prevents the expression of disease-associated proteins in the first place at the RNA level, unlike most other drug classes today that act at the protein level. This has been likened to stopping the flood by turning off the faucet instead of mopping up the floor. By interrupting the gene expression cascade at the RNA stage, this should not only make for hopefully more potent drugs, but also add to the inherent innovation advantage of RNAi therapeutics.
RNAi, however, is not the first technology that targets or makes use of RNA. Although previous RNA therapeutics efforts have yielded only two U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved drugs so far, an RNA aptamer for wetstage age-related macular degeneration (AMD) (Macugen; developed by Eyetech Pharmaceuticals/OSI Pharmaceuticals) and an antisense compound for an AIDS-related condition of the eye (Vitravene; developed by Isis Pharmaceuticals), RNA therapeutics, particularly antisense as illustrated by the number of high-value collaboration agreements involving industry leader Isis Pharmaceuticals (SEC filings 1 and 2), now looks poised to deliver on some of its promise. Underlying this shift is available know-how from years of research into areas such as medicinal nucleic acid chemistry, scalable RNA synthesis technologies, and clinical experience, which has helped to familiarize the regulatory agencies with RNA-based medicines, all of which should speed up the development of RNAi therapeutics. It is therefore no coincidence that among the first to embrace RNAi therapeutics were companies that had worked previously on other types of RNA therapeutics. A financially fairly successful example is Sirna Therapeutics. Formerly known as Ribozyme Pharmaceuticals and struggling to turn ribozymes into drugs, the company looked set to join the biotech graveyard in the aftermath of the millennium stock market bubble. Running out of time, the board in 2003 decided on a major makeover. It refocused the company on the emerging RNAi opportunity, changed their name to Sirna Therapeutics, and brought in new, active investors, all to capitalize on their preexisting nucleic acid capabilities by rapidly filing a series of patents based on a tour-de-force effort of covering genes with a set of supposedly proprietary si(R)NAs and chemistries. This was complemented by obtaining access to some of the early RNAi intellectual property (IP) (Tuschl I and Fire-Mello) . Although the merits of many of these patents and applications remain to be determined, Merck & Co. in late 2006 decided Sirna Therapeutics to be their $1.1 billion ticket to becoming a major player in RNA therapeutics, leaving the corporate turnaround artists with a substantial ϳ10-fold gain in about 3 years (SEC filing 3).
The average cost of bringing a new drug to market is widely estimated as about $1 billion (DiMasi et al., 2003) , largely attributable to costly late-stage development failures. Profitability is further impacted by long development timelines (it typically takes 10-15 years for a new compound to reach the market), much of which is spent on discovering and optimizing compounds with the appropriate pharmacological properties before Investigational New Drug Application (IND)-enabling studies can be initiated. Small molecules are particularly challenging, as they can be chemically quite diverse and therefore less predictable. By contrast, RNAi therapeutics as a class is chemically quite homogeneous without compromising diverse biological potential. Consequently, it is in a matter of weeks, rather than years for small molecules, that an RNAi drug candidate may be selected for further studies once the target is identified (de Fougerolles et al., 2007) . This relative uniformity also has considerable cost advantages as investments toward the development of one RNAi compound can often be amortized across many targets if not the entire platform. The same type of predictability in the older field of antisense technology allowed a small team of Isis Pharmaceuticals scientists to develop, within 1 year, an antisense compound for the PCSK9 gene to a stage at which Bristol-Myers Squibb partnered the drug candidate at terms very favorable for such a young program, including a $15 million upfront payment (SEC filing 2). Therein also lies some of the value of the planned and ongoing RNAi therapeutics proof-of-concept studies with well-defined early measures of efficacy, including predictive biomarkers such as viral titers (respiratory syncytial virus [RSV] and HIV) and low-density lipoprotein (LDL)-cholesterol levels (hypercholesterolemia), on which future RNAi trials can be built.
LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR FINANCIAL SUCCESS
Although the number of active RNAi therapeutics clinical trials is rapidly growing and approaching a dozen (Table 1) , most of these are in the early stages and some time will pass before there will be any revenues from the sale of an RNAibased drug. Still, competition in RNAi therapeutics is intense 
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already and takes place largely on and between two levels: the small RNAi-focused biotechs and the large pharmaceuticals, Big Pharma. Because their perspectives will naturally differ, their RNAi business development strategies will be outlined separately.
THE SMALL BIOTECH PERSPECTIVE
As for the rest of the biotech industry, staying alive while transforming technology into drugs with minimal dilution for shareholders is critical for the financial success of the fledgling RNAi therapeutics company. In the absence of recurring revenues from the sale of drugs, IP becomes the dominant currency. It must be said that the field of RNAi therapeutics has proven itself to be exceptionally adept in monetizing IP and attracting early-stage funding. Several hundreds of millions of dollars have thus flown into the coffers of RNAi therapeutics companies in the form of venture capital, initial public offering (IPO) proceeds, upfront and milestone payments from licensing and partnership arrangements, plus an attention-grabbing $1.1 billion buyout of Sirna Therapeutics by Merck & Co (Table 2 ). In fact, if interest levels can be sustained and the science continues to make progress, companies with strong IP positions may even consider these funds a sustainable source of revenue and build their business around the monetization of IP while minimizing their exposure to late-stage development risk. Taken one step further and taking a cue from the Sirna-Merck transaction, outright sale is an openly contemplated option for companies like Silence Therapeutics, Dicerna, Nastech/ MDRNA, and CytRx/RXi, all of which are busy assembling IP so as to make them attractive takeover candidates for larger companies looking for a piece of the RNAi action.
RNAi induced by synthetic siRNAs has attracted most of the interest, despite the fact that expressed, or DNA-directed RNAi (ddRNAi) has proven quite potent in a number of in vivo disease models with two ddRNAi clinical trials underway for HIV and hepatitis B virus (HBV). Much of this is due to an image problem of ddRNAi being labeled a "gene therapy," a category shunned by many investors. As a result, Benitec, ddRNAi's most visible proponent from Australia, ran into funding problems and had to beat a hasty retreat only 2 years after it established a U.S. presence. By contrast, investors are more comfortable with siRNA-induced RNAi which in certain regards bears semblance to traditional drugs. There are thus many conflicting claims as to who owns the fundamental IP to synthetic RNAi. Judging from the deal flow only, however, Alnylam Pharmaceuticals stands out for their track record of high-profile technology licensing deals. The recent alliance with the Swiss pharmaceutical Roche AG, arguably the largest of its kind in biotech history, particularly stands out and includes a $331 million upfront payment for a nonexclusive license to the therapeutic use of siRNAs under Alnylam IP in a restricted number of therapeutic areas. The foundation for this strong IP position was laid at a time when the biotech world was still ignorant of the potential of RNAi and Alnylam was methodologically gaining access to what it thought were the fundamental RNAi patents, on the express premise of avoiding the type of value erosion that the monoclonal antibody space has seen due to a fragmented IP estate.
There is, however, considerable effort spent on challenging the gatekeeper position claimed by Alnylam for RNAi therapeutics induced by synthetic small RNAs, particularly with designs that do not fully correspond to the classical and well-characterized Tuschl siRNA (ϳ19-21 base pairs [bp] with 3Ј overhangs), which is well covered by the Tuschl II patent series and exclusive to Alnylam (Table 3; Schmidt, 2007) . Much of the effort is focused on blunt-end dsRNAs longer than 21 bp, sometimes with curious modification patterns and marketed under names like AtuRNAi and Stealth. Although it is doubtful whether all of these variations on the original Tuschl design will eventually be considered to satisfy nonobviousness criteria, many of the companies involved pin their hopes on a weakened Kreutzer-Limmer I patent series, which covers dsRNA for gene silencing in human cells and to which Alnylam has gained exclusive access with its acquisition of Ribopharma AG in 2003. Specifically, it is the exact length of dsRNAs covered by Kreutzer-Limmer I that is at issue and is yet to be decided (see history of patent EP1144623 at the European Patent Office at http://www.epoline.org/portal/public/registerplus). It is then possible that if Kreutzer-Limmer I would cover only 15-to 21-bp dsRNAs as a result of the opposition, instead of the originally claimed 15-to 49-bp dsRNAs, the IP toll due to Alnylam could be considerably reduced for some of these nontraditional designs.
Another wild card in the IP poker game is the fate of the Tuschl I patent application, which claims ϳ21-to 23-nucleotide RNAs for gene silencing, including their biosynthetic precursors (Table 3) . Curiously, unlike Tuschl II, which is solely owned by the Max Planck Society and exclusively licensed to Alnylam, one of the four owners of Tuschl I, the University of Massachusetts, decided to also grant access to Sirna Therapeutics and CytRx. Because it is an early patent application with potentially broad coverage, it may have been an important consideration in Merck's acquisition of Sirna. However, whereas Tuschl II is sailing through the patent offices, Tuschl I is still waiting for a decision by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and European Patent Office (EPO), and may have weaknesses regarding its coverage of dsRNAs. In any case, it is worth remembering here that a patent gives the right to prohibit somebody from using a technology, but it does not automatically give freedom to operate, which should require access to a broader IP estate. This means that companies whose survival hinges on a small set of claims are walking on thin ice, but it also means that a company like Alnylam still needs to obtain rights to certain targets and delivery IP. In addition, it is important to consider that many of the "next-generation" RNAi strategies do not (yet) benefit from wide use in the scientific community, and unless extensively validated, will increase development risk and add to the drug development cost. This may render these technologies less attractive for large pharmaceuticals contemplating a serious commitment to RNAi therapeutics.
There has been discussion about the merits of granting broad licenses to the RNAi therapeutics platform, such as in the 2005 Alnylam-Novartis collaboration agreement (Table 2 ; SEC filing 4), versus a more selective licensing strategy. This Novartis deal was partly criticized for giving away too much of the technology's future value and making Alnylam a less attractive takeover target by Big Pharma, which otherwise would have benefited the stock. This view, however, has changed given the HAUSSECKER 456 escalating upfront payments these deals are commanding now as well as a trend toward nonexclusivity (e.g., the 2007 Alnylam-Roche agreement). The considerable investments by Merck, Novartis, Roche, and others should further motivate them to speed up the development of RNAi therapeutics and as a consequence enable the technology as a whole. As such, IP is only worth as much as the extent and speed of translating RNAi into drugs, a belief that is reflected by Roche's acquisition of Alnylam's research center in Germany as part of the July 2007 landmark licensing and collaboration agreement (SEC filing 5). Alnylam's track record of aggressively licensing the technology, including smaller, more affordable licenses to targets that are not of strategic interest, and their considerable number of collaborations also counters the view that it abuses its dominant IP position such that it would limit the therapeutic potential of RNAi. Finally, following more traditional biotech funding paths, clinical-stage programs can be partnered at certain value inflection points, which may be particularly appropriate if the RNAi therapeutics platform turns out to be as prolific as it promises to be, and there will be too many targets to be pursued by a single company.
Derisking the technology is another important component of the RNAi therapeutics value equation at the early stage, both for the platform as a whole and also to differentiate a company from the increasing number of players attracted by the RNAi frenzy. This is achieved through high-quality scientific publications and the accomplishment of clinical milestones. It was really the research underlying publications in [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] , such as on RNAi delivery to the eye, lung, brain, and liver by Sirna Therapeutics, Protiva, Alnylam, and academics, that set the stage for the landmark deals with Big Pharma (McCaffrey et al., 2003; Soutschek et al., 2004; Xia et al., 2004; Bitko et al., 2005; Morrissey et al., 2005; Zimmermann et al., 2006) . For example, Alnylam has been stressing the importance of their paper on the silencing of an endogenous gene (apoB100) after systemic administration of siRNA in mice for reaching the Alnylam-Novartis agreement, part of which specifically compensated Alnylam for their work on derisking the technology. Similarly, the same study also triggered milestone payments from Merck. Although a range of diseases may be adequately addressed by direct delivery approaches, systemic, including targeted delivery, has become a holy grail for the wider applicability of RNAi therapeutics. The first demonstrated nonviral systemic approach with clinical potential is SNALP-mediated siRNA delivery to the liver (SNALP: stable nucleic acid-lipid particles, a liposome-based technology; Soutschek et al., 2004; Morrissey et al., 2005; Zimmermann et al., 2006) and it has promptly triggered a rather unfortunate and messy fight over related IP, involving the Canadian biotech companies Protiva Biotherapeutics and Tekmira Pharmaceuticals and their licensees at Sirna Therapeutics/Merck and Alnylam. The promise of systemic delivery has also led to an explosion in startups and companies refocusing their technology toward RNAi payloads, at a time when the core RNAi patent space is approaching saturation.
Although the number of technologies showing efficacy in animal models is growing rapidly, some have been associated with either clinically unsustainable dosages (Soutschek et al., 2004) or are associated with nonspecific and adverse side effects due either to the delivery vehicle or immunostimulatory effects of the siRNA payload Morrissey et al., 2005 ; delay in the avian flu RNAi programs at Alnylam and Nastech Pharmaceuticals). Moreover, concerns about the consequences of therapeutic RNAi on the endogenous microRNA pathway have been raised (Grimm et al., 2006) . Although demonstrating and improving the safety of RNAi therapeutics is of high scientific value and should allay the concerns of potential partners (Hornung et al., 2005; Judge et al., 2006; John et al., 2007) , it is less certain what impact this type of derisking has on the overall capital markets, which tend to reward THE BUSINESS OF RNAi THERAPEUTICS 457 clinical efficacy and take safety for granted. Proof-of-concept for RNAi efficacy in humans should attract more interest, and bellwether Alnylam has done a good job in conditioning the public about upcoming results in their RSV and hypercholesterolemia programs geared toward statistically demonstrating knockdown efficacy. Biosecurity initiatives, including those aimed at the threats posed by hemorrhagic fever viruses and an avian flu pandemic, are another source of revenues that are used by Alnylam, Protiva, Nastech, and others to advance their overall RNAi therapeutics platform and fill their clinical pipelines with multiple shots-on-goal. The RNAi therapeutics platform should be particularly amenable to this type of risk management, because the successful in vivo targeting of one gene could be rapidly expanded to multiple distinct target genes in the same organ. MicroRNA-based therapeutics and diagnostics represent another opportunity for diversifying risk. Consequently, Alnylam has partnered with Isis Pharmaceuticals to combine their oligonucleotide therapeutics IP and expertise to form Regulus Therapeutics LLC, a joint venture focused on the development of microRNA therapeutics (SEC filing 6). Similarly, microRNAbased therapeutics are within the scope of Nastech's RNAi spinout MDRNA (SEC filing 7). Conversely, companies like Rosetta Genomics and Asuragen, with their roots in microRNAs, also aim to develop microRNA agonists that mimic the function of endogenous microRNAs and are expected to be quite similar, if not identical, to an RNAi therapeutic. Next to the core RNAi technology, delivery, and microRNAs, further RNAi therapeutics-related opportunities are in oligonucleotide manufacturing and target discovery. While Cenix BioScience and Artemis are active mainly in the preclinical stages of this process, Quark Pharmaceuticals has used this approach and built the largest clinical RNAi pipeline to date while licensing core RNAi technology from Silence Therapeutics and Alnylam. Finally, as the industry matures and products come on-line, manufacturing technologies are of increasing importance and represent yet another RNAi therapeutics-related business opportunity.
THE BIG PHARMA PERSPECTIVE
Big Pharma has entered a challenging period. Looming patent expirations and loss of exclusive marketing rights for a number of blockbuster drugs, bloated sales and marketing departments, and a small-molecule drug development platform that appears to be nearing saturation with consequently declining drug approval rates within an increasingly risk-averse regulatory environment mean that change is not a choice, but a must for Big Pharma. A December 2007 report in the Wall Street Journal estimated that generic competition alone will cost the industry $67 billion in U.S. sales between 2007 and 2012 (Martinez and Goldstein, 2007) . Meanwhile, biotechnology, enjoying high margins for innovative products addressing unmet medical needs with comparatively little generic competition to speak of, has just reached the threshold to profitability after years of suffering losses. Biotechnology, and RNA-based therapeutics in particular, also benefits from a trend toward evidence-based medicine and biomedical research that seeks to treat disease at its root molecular cause. It is therefore not surprising that large cap pharmaceuticals have come forward and made clear their intention to transform themselves into top-tier biotech companies. Fortunately, generally strong balance sheets mean that Big Pharma still has the financial means to implement these changes and invest in innovation-but how?
At a time when partnering conferences outnumber new drug approvals, there are a few general philosophies concerning how Big Pharma might proceed. The quick fix would be to buy established biotech companies outright, but as the $15.6 billion buyout of MedImmune by AstraZeneca and the thwarted attempt to sell Biogen Idec demonstrate, this can come at a high price. Another option with potential near-term revenue opportunities would be to invest in promising clinical-stage compounds, thereby letting small biotechs do what they are best at, namely developing innovative medicines, while reducing financial risk and leveraging Big Pharma's late-stage development expertise and sales and marketing reach. However, as competition for these increasingly rare opportunities intensifies, the equation is beginning to shift in favor of the biotech. The only way for Big Pharma to remain in control of the drug industry is therefore to start developing biotech products themselves. Unlike recombinant proteins and monoclonal antibodies, where Big Pharma waited until the technology had reached a relatively mature stage, it has already made a number of significant investments in RNAi therapeutics ( Table 2 ). The escalating terms further emphasize that Big Pharma can ill afford not to take a stake in a technology that, although clinically largely unproven, may be the next once-in-a-decade innovation engine. Although RNAi therapeutics have caught much of the attention, this is taking place at a time of heightened interest in RNA-based technologies in general as illustrated by the recent takeover of Coley Pharmaceuticals by Pfizer (immune-stimulatory nucleic acids) and a broad drug development collaboration between GlaxoSmithKline and Santaris (antisense) potentially worth more than $700 million.
This trend of investing early in the technology is also in part inspired by the prescient investment Roche made in 1990 when it took a majority stake in biotech pioneer Genentech. The danger with such arrangements is that once a biotech has been consumed by Big Pharma it will start behaving like one itself. It is therefore thought that an important element for the success of the Roche-Genentech alliance was Roche's decision to let Genentech operate as a largely independent organization, thereby avoiding choking the innovation of the entrepreneurial biotech company that is so desired by Big Pharma. It may therefore not be surprising that Roche acquired Alnylam's productive European research unit as part of the Alnylam-Roche agreement (SEC filing 5) with the intention of letting it operate away from headquarters as the "Roche Center of Excellence for RNAi Therapeutics." Similar biotech incubators are now being formed by Merck & Co., Pfizer, and even by first-generation biotechs themselves, including Biogen Idec, which not coincidentally is also Alnylam's first top-tier biotech partner.
Instead of going on an impulse shopping spree buying expensive IP licenses and RNAi therapeutics outfits, the more cautious approach is to take the time and test the technology first, and then obtain the necessary IP if it is found satisfying. Experience may come from using RNAi as part of the target validation process or through exploratory small-scale collaborations. Pfizer comes to mind here with a sizeable number of HAUSSECKER 458 small, measured deals spanning the whole spectrum from target validation, delivery, and therapeutics, including a license for DNA-directed RNAi from Sigma-Aldrich/Benitec for research purposes, target-specific RNAi therapeutics development programs for wet AMD and hepatitis C virus (HCV) involving Quark Pharmaceuticals/Silence Therapeutics and Tacere Therapeutics, respectively, and a promising RNAi delivery collaboration with Mirus Bio. Although a high-profile deal has been lacking, this could change given Pfizer's recent acquisition of oligonucleotide therapeutics company Coley Pharmaceuticals and the launch of a "Biotherapeutics and Bioinnovation Center" in the San Francisco Bay Area. This organization is led by biotech veteran Corey Goodman who, according to press reports, vowed to make Pfizer a leader in RNAi therapeutics (Tansey, 2007) . Another example is Novartis, with a history in antisense and an early adopter of using RNAi for target validation (Hemmings-Mieszczak et al., 2003) including a pioneering siRNA development collaboration with research reagent supplier Qiagen. Two years later, in 2005, Novartis would close a major RNAi therapeutics deal with Alnylam.
It will be interesting to see whether Pfizer and other companies in similar situations follow in Novartis's path and seek out Alnylam for freedom to operate, or rather Merck's example in flexing their financial muscles to assert their rights to pursue RNAi therapeutics on their own terms by searching for loopholes in Alnylam's patent estate. The latter may be exploited by the smaller players that are building ready-for-sale IP packages around nonclassical RNAi inducers. This wait-andsee approach is further facilitated by a 2005 Supreme Court decision on Merck v. Integra that broadly exempts the use of patented inventions in preclinical research and development without fear of infringement [Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) ], and could delay patent confrontations until RNAi therapeutics are about to be commercialized.
SAFE HARBOR: RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES OF RNAi THERAPEUTICS
A basic principle of economics is the inverse relationship of risk and return. The fact that market caps of individual biotechs with little more to show than a single approved drug may easily exceed that of all the pure-play RNAi therapeutics companies combined, reflects the risk, but also the time involved in realizing the therapeutic promise of RNAi.
Above all, it is the science that matters most. The delivery challenge is often cited and despite a growing literature on delivery to the brain, bone, spleen, cancers, and other targets, it is still uncertain which technologies will be able to combine safety and efficacy. It should not be forgotten, however, that with incremental progress of current delivery capabilities for the eye, lung, and liver, the potential market for RNAi therapeutics should already be considerable. Furthermore, if RNAi can live up to the targeted delivery challenge, it may become an inherently even more selective and therefore safer class of medicines. Other technology risks relate to off-targeting (Jackson et al., 2003) , the induction of unwanted cytokine responses (Hornung et al., 2005) , and interfering with the RNAi-related endogenous microRNA pathway (Grimm et al., 2006) . While Tuschl's discovery illustrates how evolution has lent RNAi therapeutics a helping hand in many ways, the therapeutically unfortunate overlap of RNAi with the microRNA pathway, and innate immunity in humans in particular, have dashed early hopes for an easy route toward drugs with essentially no side effects. These risks, however, should be manageable through molecular biology-guided medicinal chemistry (siRNA) and gene therapy (DNA-directed RNAi). For example, off-targeting and cytokine responses can be significantly reduced through both bioinformatics and nucleic acid chemistry (Jackson et al., 2006; Judge et al., 2006; Birmingham et al., 2007) . It would be, however, naive to expect an RNAi therapy, or any other therapy for that matter, to be 100% target specific and to have no side effect.
There is also the trade-off between (1) entering clinical studies now, partly because investors tend to feel better about biotech companies with a clinical pipeline, or (2) take advantage of the rapid progress in the field and hold off entering the clinic. The history of Alnylam's ALN-RSV01 may be an interesting example. Recent top-line data from a phase I inhalation study of the unmodified siRNAs for the treatment of RSV, while supporting robust delivery of siRNAs to the lung via nebulizer, indicated some adverse responses in the high single-dose groups. Although there is good reason to believe that the therapeutic index should allow for the successful development of this drug and the determination of the maximal tolerated dose is an intended outcome of such studies, it is interesting to speculate that Alnylam would have opted for a modified, and therefore potentially even safer and more predictable siRNA for RSV, had they not fast-tracked ALN-RSV01 soon after their previous lead program for AMD was put on hold because of a changing competitive landscape for AMD. Given that both decisions were announced in one press release, it is not too farfetched to speculate that Wall Street pressure to make good on their projected goal of one IND before the end of 2005 played a part in this. Even then, Alnylam shares would lose 8% of their value on the day of the announcement and 23% over the next month, compared with a loss of 4% for the NASDAQ. With a robust balance sheet, the motivation for entering the clinic with a systemic, liposomal RNAi formulation for treating diseases of the liver appears different now, and the decisions by Alnylam, but also Sirna Therapeutics/Merck, to postpone IND submissions for systemic RNAi programs are intended to allow them to optimize the safety of their delivery formulations first and then apply them to a range of targets.
Ironically, some of the first-generation RNAi drug candidates that entered the clinic based on promising preclinical data may work, but for all the wrong reasons. This is because of the potential for nucleic acids to stimulate innate immune responses, which are known to be capable of antiviral (Morrissey et al., 2005) , antiangiogenic (von Marschall et al., 2003) , and anticancer activities (Krieg, 2008) . Although long known from experience with antisense and gene therapy, with attempts even to harness those properties of nucleic acids for therapy, this was initially shoved aside by a young and fearless RNAi therapeutics field, and insufficient controls may have led to the misinterpretation of early animal data. Indeed, the concept of therapeutic "isiRNAs," that is, siRNAs combining potentially synergistic gene silencing and immune-stimulatory activities, has been discussed (Schlee et al., 2006) . It would certainly not
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be the first time, or even surprising, to find drugs to be safe and efficacious, but working through an unanticipated mechanism of action. Yet the realization that early RNAi drugs may have been clinically successful because of these nonspecific effects rather than gene silencing may negatively impact the perceived value of the RNAi platform, both because these responses increase development risk and because there would be no need to buy expensive RNAi IP when access to immune-stimulatory nucleic acids may be obtained for much less. Despite all the excitement surrounding RNAi, getting the attention of Wall Street in the crowded RNAi market can be difficult, as illustrated by Quark Pharmaceutical's failed 2006 IPO attempt. A recurring theme to achieve this is by claiming to be the best by being first: the first in entering the clinic with an RNAi candidate, the first in systemic delivery, the first in anticancer RNAi, and so on. Who would have thought, for example, that Acuity Pharmaceuticals (now part of OPKO Health) would beat the likes of Alnylam and Sirna Therapeutics in filing an RNAi IND for wet AMD? One does not have to look far to appreciate the danger of one clinical blunder to cast a shadow over the entire RNAi space. Gene therapy, despite its real progress and promise for treating a number of serious diseases, is now suffering the consequences of unrealistically high expectations and rushed clinical trials in its early stages. Add to this the occasional clinical adverse event, and a technology can easily find itself shunned by investors and patients. This has even led to the unfortunate situation where a number of RNAi therapeutics companies go to great lengths to avoid being associated with the mere concept of "gene therapy." Similarly, RNAi is sometimes viewed as promising to succeed where antisense has failed. Nevertheless, RNAi, gene therapy, and oligonucleotide-based therapeutics in general, have much to learn from each other. At least between RNAi and antisense, there is an emerging sense that progress in either of these technologies can be interpreted as a validation of RNA therapeutics as a whole. It is encouraging to see Alnylam and Isis Pharmaceuticals, both leaders in their respective fields, working closely together on technology and business development, with the microRNA therapeutics spin-off Regulus Therapeutics as its most visible result.
An early clinical mistake may also not be well received by the regulatory agencies and raise the bar for future trials at a time when the FDA and its counterparts have been severely criticized for their record in ensuring drug safety. This is also true for third-party payers, who are loath to cover innovative but expensive biotech drugs when there are cheaper, although not necessarily functionally equivalent, drugs available. Although it is hoped that RNAi drugs will help rather than further burden the health care system, as a result of the likely development efficiencies and the fact that the cost for the siRNA component of an RNAi drug should eventually fall between that for a small molecule and biologics (Glaser, 2007) , one should not expect RNAi therapies to compete on price alone. On the other hand, the same simple principle behind RNAi that makes it so attractive for drug development in the first place also means that RNAi-based drugs, especially those with uncomplicated delivery, should face more generic pressure than biologics currently do. The history of RNAi may appear fast-paced, but in terms of patent life it is already in its adolescence.
The battle for these patents, the current life blood of RNAi therapeutics, further risks becoming a major financial drain and a source of management distraction. While it is understood that having a validated patent position is existential for many of these companies, one sometimes has to wonder how one can justify before shareholders the significant resources spent on litigation rather than on R&D in cases like Benitec v. Nucleonics or Tekmira v. Protiva on matters related to DNA-directed RNAi and liposomal delivery, respectively. The Tekmira-Protiva case is probably the best example of how, by setting aside personal ambition and combining know-how and IP, the whole would be much greater than the sum of its parts-also in terms of company valuation.
OUTLOOK
After making good preclinical progress and proving successful in monetizing its IP, the RNAi therapeutics space is now entering a stage at which it must demonstrate clinical efficacy while continuing to develop enabling technologies. Whereas the number of companies working on RNAi delivery is rapidly expanding, the number of pure-play RNAi companies working on the RNAi trigger itself is about to peak with some of the stronger ones gradually being absorbed into larger entities and those with weak IP disappearing as funding dries out. Altogether, this should provide for a rich environment with business activity and cash flows on multiple levels, and maybe even producing first revenues from the sale of drugs in 2010-2012. Whether all this becomes reality depends on the science, which by definition is unpredictable. But with the fundamental gift of nature that RNAi is and human ingenuity, personified by the many people around the world working on making RNAi therapeutics become a reality, chances are high that RNAi will end up doing well by doing good.
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